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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE LAST BROODING OMNIPRESENCE: ERIE RAILROAD CO. v.
TOMPKINS AND THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF PREEMPTIVE
FEDERAL MARITIME LAW

ERNEST A. YOUNG*
Justice Holmes said in 1917 that “[t]he common law is not a brooding
omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign . . . that can
be identified.”1 This understanding is central to the way we think about law
today, and it laid the groundwork for Justice Brandeis’ later pronouncement, in
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, that “[e]xcept in matters governed by the
Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case
is the law of the State. . . . There is no federal general common law.”2
What people outside the admiralty community tend to forget, however, is
that Holmes was in dissent. The fight he was losing was Southern Pacific Co.
v. Jensen, which held that the general common law of admiralty preempted
contrary state law, even though no federal statute or constitutional provision
spoke to the question at issue.3 And while Holmes’ condemnation of brooding
omnipresences in Jensen is no less accepted today as a matter of general
jurisprudence than his rejection of economic substantive due process in
Lochner v. New York,4 the Jensen doctrine remains good law in admiralty.5
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law. This paper was originally
presented at the meeting of the Maritime Section of the Association of American Law Schools in
New Orleans on January 8, 1999, at which time I was Visiting Assistant Professor of Law at
Villanova University School of Law. I am grateful to Joel Goldstein for inviting me to present
this paper at the AALS meeting, and to Heather Gerken, Marc Goldman, John Gotanda, Mike
Rosenthal, Michael Sturley, and Kim Vasconi for helpful comments on this version of the paper.
I have also benefited from conversations with Jonathan Gutoff, David Robertson, and Louise
Weinberg. Finally, I would like to thank Professors Robert Force and Steven Friedell not only for
their many insights, but also for dealing so graciously with one new to the maritime field. For a
more extended treatment of this subject, see Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 273 (1999).
1. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
3. 224 U.S. at 217-18.
4. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)
(rejecting economic substantive due process).
5. See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 447 n.1 (1994) (refusing “to
overrule Jensen in dictum, and without argument or even invitation”). Of course, with
endorsements like this, Jensen may not need critics.
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The result is that despite Erie, there remains a general federal common law of
admiralty that exists wholly apart from federal statutes or constitutional
provisions. There is still, in David Robertson’s phrase, a “brooding
omnipresence” over the sea.6
The Jensen rule reflects the federal courts’ effort to fit the “general”
common law of admiralty into a post-Erie framework that recognizes only two
kinds of law: state and federal.7 By shoehorning maritime law into the
“federal” box, Jensen created a broad rule of preemption that allows federal
courts to preempt state regulatory authority without grounding their decisions
in a federal statute or constitutional provision. My argument is that this broad
rule of maritime preemption is unconstitutional.
It may help to start with a concrete case that can serve as a basis for
discussion. In 1989, a tanker inappropriately named the “World Prodigy” ran
aground in Rhode Island’s Narragansett Bay, spilling over 300,000 gallons of
heating oil into the bay. Although authorities did a fairly good job of promptly
cleaning up the spill, the cleanup operation basically shut down the Bay for a
period of two weeks. Because much of Rhode Island’s economy depends on
the Bay, many people were hurt by even the temporary shutdown of access. In
Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, a group of shellfish dealers who lost
money because of the spill sued the shipping company to recover their losses.8
The shellfish dealers based their claims on Rhode Island’s Compensation
Act,9 which held shipowners liable for any harms arising from negligence or
violations of state pilotage and pollution laws, including purely economic
losses.10 The problem with the plaintiffs’ state law claim was that federal
maritime law dictated a contrary result. In the 1927 case of Robins Dry Dock
& Repair Co. v. Flint—ironically also authored by Justice Holmes—the
Supreme Court said that the general maritime law did not permit recovery of
purely economic losses in cases of maritime tort.11 The question in Ballard
6. DAVID W. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM: HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF
PROBLEMS OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN THE MARITIME LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 193
(1970).
7. In this sense, Justice Holmes misunderstood the majority’s project in Jensen: Justice
McReynolds’ majority opinion in fact rejected the idea of law as a “brooding omnipresence” that
need not be grounded in either a state or federal source. Jensen is to this extent a precursor of
Erie. But Justice Holmes was also condemning the idea of law that was “general” in the sense of
untethered judicial lawmaking. In that sense, Holmes’s view prevailed in Erie—federal courts
generally have no lawmaking power apart from federal statutes—and Jensen is the anomaly.
8. 32 F.3d 623, 624 (1st Cir. 1994).
9. Id. at 624 (citing Rhode Island Environmental Injury Compensation Act, R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 46-12-3 (1998)).
10. By purely economic losses, I mean losses to persons who can’t show any physical injury
to their property. The shellfish dealers, for instance, didn’t own the Bay or the beaches that were
hurt; they simply couldn’t purchase shellfish from fishermen in the Bay as a result of the spill.
11. 275 U.S. 303, 309 (1927).
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Shipping was whether the Robins Dry Dock rule preempted the Rhode Island
statute.
Ballard Shipping poses the central problem of maritime preemption very
starkly. The Robins Dry Dock rule is purely a rule of general common law – it
has no even arguable relationship to any federal statute or constitutional
provision. The Rhode Island Compensation Act is a classic state police power
statute, protecting what may be Rhode Island’s most vital resource.
Preemption of state law ordinarily requires not only a federal statute but also a
clear statement of Congress’s intent to preempt state law.12 Nonetheless, under
Jensen, the shipping company had a strong argument for preemption of the
Rhode Island statute.
I.

THE ADMIRALTY LAW BACKGROUND

Article III, § 2 of the Constitution extends “[t]he judicial Power” “to all
Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.”13 Note that there’s no
substantive grant of lawmaking authority either here or in Article I. The
federal courts’ common lawmaking powers in admiralty have been implied
from the jurisdictional grant, and Congress’s own lawmaking authority has
been implied from that of the courts.14
The Judiciary Act of 1789 implemented the jurisdictional grant by
conferring “exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and

12. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992); Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
13. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
14. See, e.g., Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360-61 (1959).
I resist Professor Friedell’s suggestion that the admiralty grant is uniquely “based not on the
status of the parties but on the subject matter of the dispute.” Steven F. Friedell, The Diverse
Nature of Admiralty Jurisdiction, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1389, 1391 (1999). See also J. John R.
Brown, Admiralty Judges: Flotsam on the Sea of Maritime Law?, 24 J. MAR. L. & COM. 249, 251
(1993) (making the same point). After all, Article III defines the general federal question
jurisdiction in subject-matter terms, yet the courts have soundly rejected the proposition that this
confers a general common lawmaking power on the federal courts. See Texas Indus., Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (noting that federal common lawmaking
powers are “few and restricted”). Moreover, the current version of the “subject matter” test for
admiralty jurisdiction is administered so loosely as to make admiralty jurisdiction largely a
question of locality. See Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 373 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment); Thomas C. Galligan, The Admiralty Extension Act at Fifty, 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 495,
506 (1998) (“When water is present it will be a rare case in which a party asserting maritime
jurisdiction will not be able to at least make a colorable argument for jurisdiction based upon its
characterization of the relevant incident and activity.”). Admiralty, in other words, is largely a
place—not a subject. Finally, even if Professor Friedell’s suggestion were correct, the subjectbased nature of the jurisdictional grant would be significant for preemption purposes only if the
subject were inherently federal. The Supreme Court held early on that it was not. See American
Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 545-46 (1828) (Marshall, C.J.).
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maritime jurisdiction” on the federal district courts.15 The exclusivity of this
grant was qualified, however, by something called the “Saving Clause,” which
“sav[es] to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy where the
common law is competent to give it.”16 The Saving Clause is generally taken
to mean two things. Most maritime claims can be brought in state court; and
there is at least some potential role for state law in admiralty cases whether in
state court or federal court.17
Jensen narrowed the role of state law in admiralty by holding that “no
[state] legislation is valid if it . . . works material prejudice to the characteristic
features of the general maritime law, or interferes with the proper harmony and
uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations.”18 There has
been some dispute about what that formula means precisely, but two points
stand out: First, it is frequently interpreted—especially by lower courts—to
mean that federal common law governs whenever admiralty jurisdiction is
present, regardless of contrary state law.19 And second, however Jensen is
construed, its preemption rule is different from the rules that govern
preemption questions in all other contexts—and considerably broader.
The Jensen question goes straight to the nature of federal common law
generally. As I’ve said, admiralty law is the last survivor of an earlier way of
thinking about law. It is, in other words, another form of “general” common
law much like the general commercial law articulated in the Nineteenth
Century under Swift v. Tyson.20 For this reason, the legitimacy of Jensen must
be evaluated within a broader context that includes both the historical learning
about general law under Swift and modern constitutional doctrine concerning
federal common law and preemption.
II. THE PRIMA FACIE CASE AGAINST JENSEN
The “prima facie” case against Jensen’s strong rule of maritime
preemption begins with Erie, which I read as announcing a principle of judicial
federalism: While the Commerce Clause would probably have covered the law

15. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 76-77 (1789). The modern version is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1333
(1994).
16. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(a), 1 Stat. 77 (1789).
17. See, e.g., Brainerd Currie, The Silver Oar and All That: A Study of the Romero Case, 27
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 57 (1959) (discussing state court suits); David W. Robertson, Federalism and
Uniformity in Maritime Laws: The Applicability of State Law in Maritime Cases after Yamaha
Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 81, 84 (1996) (suggesting that the saving clause
“express[es] what the Court has taken as a quasi-constitutional commitment to achieving the
proper mix of state and federal law in the maritime realm”).
18. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216.
19. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1031-32 (5th Cir.
1985) (en banc).
20. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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at issue in Erie, even in 1938, courts have no power to go first in making
federal law.21 In a post-Garcia world, the separation of powers principle that
only Congress makes federal law protects federalism as well by channeling
lawmaking decisions into the institution where the States are represented
directly.22
Of course, it wasn’t long after Erie before courts and commentators
acknowledged the continued existence of what Judge Friendly called the “new
federal common law.”23 Unlike the “general” common law that existed prior
to Erie, this law was tied either to federal statutes (like the antitrust laws) or to
particular federal interests like foreign relations or the proprietary dealings of
the federal government itself. Also unlike the “general” common law, this law
is “federal” within the meaning of the Supremacy Clause and therefore has
preemptive effect.
The new federal common law raises few separation of powers or
federalism concerns so long as courts are simply filling in the gaps of a federal
statute. The reason is that Congress has made the primary legislative judgment
in such cases and the states are politically represented in that process. In
admiralty, however, courts generally make law wholly apart from any federal
statute, and the separation of powers and federalism problems become more
compelling.
In his introduction, Professor Goldstein rightly points out that Erie has not
generally been applied to admiralty.24 But it is insufficient simply to cite Pope
& Talbot25 and conclude that “the Erie limitation did not apply at sea.”26 The
21. See Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and
Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1478-93 (1997); Martha A. Field,
Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 924 (1986). See
also Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 640 (stating the ordinary rule that
instances of appropriate federal common lawmaking are “few and restricted”).
22. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1985) (holding
that federalism is protected primarily through the states’ representation in Congress, rather than
through substantive judicial review of federal legislation); Herbert Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the
National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954) (making a similar argument).
23. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 383 (1964).
24. Joel K. Goldstein, Federal Common Law in Admiralty: An Introduction to the Beginning
of an Exchange, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1337, 1344 (1999). It might not be unfair, however, to
characterize such decisions as Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996), as doing
exactly that.
25. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953). As I have pointed out elsewhere,
Pope & Talbot did not directly address the basic Erie issue – whether Erie would not apply as
given. See Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 311-12 (1999). In
any event, asserting that Erie not apply simply because it wasn’t an admiralty case is rather like
saying Erie was decided on a Tuesday, while Pope & Talbot came down on a Wednesday. It is
the scope of the underlying justification that matters.
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question is why this should be so. My argument is that this limitation on Erie
rests on two equally shaky pillars: a generalized policy argument for
uniformity that has been increasingly rejected as a basis for federal common
law in other areas,27 and a set of historical assumptions about the nature of
maritime law in the 18th and 19th centuries that is simply mistaken.28 The
continuing confusion in the area of maritime federalism29 reflects the
inadequacy of these foundations, which have failed to resolve the basic
underlying tension between Jensen and the structural principles that Erie
recognized.
Professor Goldstein also seeks to minimize this tension by harmonizing
Jensen’s strong rule of maritime preemption with the “process federalism”
doctrine of Garcia.30 Goldstein’s argument is that Jensen’s maritime
preemption regime satisfies Garcia, since Congress is always free to override
federal common law created by admiralty courts.31 But Goldstein concedes that
26. Goldstein, supra note 24, at 1344. See also Theodore F. Stevens, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins
and the Uniform General Maritime Law, 64 HARV. L. REV. 246 (1950) (arguing prior to Pope &
Talbot that Erie should not be applied to admiralty).
27. Professor Stevens, for example, rested his argument against importing Erie into
admiralty upon this ground. See Stevens, supra note 26, at 268-70. But the Court has shown
little sympathy for such generalized pleas for uniformity as a basis for federal common law,
particularly in recent years. See, e.g., Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 220 (1997) (“To invoke
the concept of ‘uniformity’ . . . is not to prove its need.”); O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512
U.S. 79, 88 (1994) (rejecting “that most generic (and lightly invoked) of alleged federal interests,
the interest in uniformity”); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 730 (1979)
(rejecting “generalized pleas for uniformity as substitutes for concrete evidence that adopting
state law would adversely affect administration of the federal programs”).
28. See infra Part II.A. My argument concerning the 19th century practice under Swift v.
Tyson is not so much that Jensen is “a relic of the rejected Swift v. Tyson era,” Goldstein supra
note 24, at 1341, but rather that Jensen is unfaithful even to the practice of that time. See infra at
Part III.B. see also Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 25, at 318-28. For that reason, Jensen
can find no historical warrant in the historical treatment of maritime law during the 19th century.
29. See infra Part III.B.
30. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). While it is always
a pleasure to find areas of agreement with my friend Joel Goldstein, his suggestion that I share his
“admiration” for Garcia may be going a little far. Goldstein, supra note 24, at 1344. By
suggesting that “process federalism” is a sufficient protection for state autonomy and authority,
Garcia undermined the foundations of constitutional government. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 56667 (Powell, J., dissenting); William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH.
L. REV. 1709 (1985). But it is equally true that critics of Garcia may have overlooked process
federalism’s protential to support more secure protections for state authority than currently exist
in many areas of the law. See generally Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the
Future of Federalism, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. __ (forthcoming). The area of maritime preemption is
a good example, since the current regime under Jensen would be unconstitutional even under
Garcia.
31. Goldstein, supra note 24, at 1345. Some of Professor Goldstein’s admiralty colleagues
might argue that Congress cannot, in fact, override the common law of admiralty – especially if
Congress is acting to restore regulatory authority to individual state governments. See, e.g.,
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Jensen shifts the burden of overcoming legislative inertia from those who
would have federal law trump state law – who must shoulder it under
traditional preemption principles – to those who would revive superseded state
authority.32 This difference is by no means “trivial and inconsequential”;33
indeed, it ignores the important sense in which legislative inertia, as well as the
difficult institutional barriers that any legislative proposal must overcome
before being enacted in federal law under Article I, are the primary “political
safeguards of federalism.”34
Frequently, admiralty judges are particularly eager to circumvent these
safeguards because they view the maritime law as a complete common law
system. Most common law systems are supposed to have “no gaps in the law”
— questions of first impression are to be answered by inference from the
resolution of related issues, policy judgments, and the like.35 Courts don’t give
a non liquet judgment – “the law is not clear.”
This is the way state legal systems work. State statutes are largely
interstitial additions to the background common law framework. It is
emphatically not the way federal law works. Congress legislates interstitially
against the background of state law, and federal common law is made in the
interstices of federal statutes.36
This highlights the primary constraint on federal law – the practical limits
on Congress’s ability to get things done. These limits ensure that there are
gaps in federal law, and those gaps leave breathing space for state regulatory

Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 164-65 (1920) (striking down federal statute
explicitly permitting application of state workers’ compensation statutes to maritime cases). The
conventional wisdom – in the federal courts community, at least – is that Knickerbocker Ice was a
product of the Lochner period and would not be followed today. See, e.g., PAUL M. BATOR ET
AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 893 n.5 (3d ed.
1988). The fact that the Knickerbocker Ice view is still taken seriously in admiralty circles, see,
e.g., David J. Bederman, Uniformity, Delegation and the Dormant Admiralty Clause, 28 J. MAR.
L. & COM. 1, 19-33 (1997); THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 1-1,
at 6 (2d ed. 1994), shows how far these two segments of legal academia have diverged on basic
issues of federalism and separation of powers.
32. Goldstein, supra note 24, at 1345.
33. Id.
34. See Young, State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 30; Bradford R. Clark, Federal
Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1261 (1996) (observing
that the Art. I process is designed “to make the exercise of [federal] governmental authority . . .
more difficult. The Constitution thus reserves substantial lawmaking power to the states and the
people both by limiting the powers assigned to the federal government and by rendering that
government frequently incapable of exercising them”).
35. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION 67 (1981); Steven D. Smith, Courts, Creativity, and the Duty to Decide a Case,
1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 573 (1985).
36. See BATOR, supra note 31, at 533.
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authority even in a world where state and federal regulatory jurisdiction largely
overlap.
But admiralty is very different. The law of the sea is a freestanding
common law system, and it has generally been treated as subject to the rule of
completeness. When an admiralty case raises a question on which there is no
preexisting rule, federal admiralty judges tend to act like Ronald Dworkin’s
Hercules, creating a new rule by drawing on the more general principles and
policies of the maritime law.37 They don’t always do this, of course, but when
they don’t admiralty scholars tend to take the judges to task for not living up to
their responsibilities.38
In other words, federal admiralty courts aren’t like Congress, which may
decide to respect state interests by not legislating at all and which, in any
event, is constrained by inertia from regulating very much. Admiralty courts
are instead like little lawmaking machines which can’t help but create the law
necessary to answer any question that is put to them. Robins Dry Dock is an
example: There was no deliberate decision in that case that a federal rule was
necessary on the issue of purely economic losses. Rather, the issue simply
came up in an admiralty case, and the Court was obliged to provide an answer.
But once that rule was out there, it had a potentially preemptive effect on the
ability of states to answer the question differently.39
The last piece of the puzzle is the rules that ordinarily govern preemption
cases. The old rule was one of automatic field preemption—any federal
involvement in a field preempted that field. This rule became untenable when
the federal government became involved in numerous fields under the New
Deal.40
The modern rule allows preemption of state law only where Congress
specifically intends it to occur.41 And there is a presumption in interpreting
federal statutes that Congress does not intend to preempt unless it clearly says
so.42 By forcing a deliberate decision by Congress before preemption occurs,
the presumption ensures that the political safeguards of federalism have a
chance to operate. As the Court explained in Gregory v. Ashcroft:

37. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130 (1977) (describing
Hercules’ methodology).
38. See, e.g., Joel K. Goldstein, The Life and Times of Wilburn Boat: A Critical Guide (Part
II), 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 555, 580 (1997) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s “recent retreat from
its role of expositor of general maritime law”).
39. See, e.g., IMTT-Gretna v. Robert E. Lee S.S., 993 F.2d 1193, 1195 (5th Cir. 1993).
40. See generally Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV.
767 (1994).
41. See id. at 805. See, e.g., Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369
(1986); Gardbaum, supra note 40, at 805.
42. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516;
Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. at 230.
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[I]nasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to the political process
the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress’ Commerce
Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such an
exercise. ‘To give the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere
congressional ambiguity would evade the very procedure for lawmaking on
which Garcia relied to protect states’ interests.’43

Jensen turns this rule on its head. If Congress passes a law, the
presumption is that it does not preempt state law. But if a federal judge makes
up a rule of admiralty, it almost always does preempt state law even though
Congress has never acted at all.
It should not be surprising that Jensen works this way – when it was
decided, the rule was that preemption broadly follows from any federal
involvement in the field. So because admiralty was clearly a “federal” field for
some purposes, it had to be federal for all. But that isn’t the way preemption
works anymore, and the maritime practice has failed to reflect that.
That’s the prima facie case against a strong, special rule of maritime
preemption. Such a rule violates Erie’s principle of judicial federalism by
permitting federal courts to displace state law even though they do not purport
to be interpreting or filling in the gaps of a federal statute. And Jensen’s rule
also violates modern preemption rules by permitting preemption without a
clear showing that Congress intended such preemption to occur.
III. THE HISTORY
Admiralty people tend to answer these kinds of criticisms with a historical
argument. That argument can take one of two forms: An originalist argument,
based on the claim that the Framers intended the admiralty clause to provide a
uniform substantive law governing maritime commerce, or a more
evolutionary argument, emphasizing the years of precedent and practice that
have built up around Jensen’s rule.44 Even taking these arguments on their
own methodological terms,45 neither one is persuasive.
43. 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991) (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 6-25, at 480 (2d ed. 1988)).
44. I am not, as Professor Force suggests, see Robert Force, An Essay on Federal Common
Law and Admiralty, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1367, 1368-9 (1999), arguing that a correct historical
construction of the Admiralty Clause should trump pragmatic considerations. Rather, history and
pragmatics are two distinct sorts of arguments usually advanced by Jensen’s defenders to justify a
departure from generally accepted rules governing preemption and federal common law. In any
event, as I explain below, pragmatic considerations actually favor abandoning Jensen. See infra
Part IV.A.
45. Of course, one need not accept the originalist premises of Jensen’s defenders. I, for one,
do not. See Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and
Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619 (1994) (offering a conservative critique of
originalism). For example, there are strong arguments for strictly enforcing the limits on
preemption and federal common law embodied in current case law as a necessary counterweight
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Originalist History

My review of the history leads me to accept the proposition that the
Framers intended for federal courts to apply a common law of admiralty,
sometimes called the “Law of the Sea.” But this doesn’t justify a broad rule of
maritime preemption for two reasons:
1.

The Purpose of the Admiralty Grant

First, the general purpose of the admiralty grant appears to have been
intended to cover three types of specialized cases which can be grouped
together as “public law” cases: (1) prize and capture cases; (2) crimes
committed on the high seas, such as piracy; and (3) offenses against the federal
revenue laws, which at that time relied heavily on maritime commerce.46
These public law categories are relatively unimportant to the modern admiralty
docket, which is dominated by private law claims. We have little need for
prize jurisdiction, as Preble Stolz pointed out, because “civilization has
matured to the point that ships are sunk rather than stolen.”47 If the sorts of
cases that motivated the drafters of the Admiralty Clause are largely gone
today, it seems difficult to justify a departure from Erie and the normal
preemption rules on originalist grounds.
The best answer to this point is that the Framers were pretty clearly aware
that the admiralty grant would also cover private maritime claims. We know
this from Jonathan Gutoff’s work demonstrating that there were already a good
number of these cases in the admiralty courts by 1789.48 But the reasons for
creating federal admiralty jurisdiction seem to have had much more to do with
the need to treat foreigners fairly and to speak with a unified national voice on
issues that might affect foreign relations. These rationales apply primarily to
the “public law” sorts of cases. To the extent that fair treatment of foreigners
in private law cases was a concern – for instance, in international trade cases,
analogous to modern-day COGSA, charter-party, and marine insurance
litigation involving parties from different nations – that concern seems

to the Twentieth Century expansion of federal power, regardless of whether the Framers actually
envisioned those particular limitations on the federal government. Cf. Lawrence Lessig,
Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125. In any event, the
originalist evidence actually undermines Jensen’s validity.
46. See Preble Stolz, Pleasure Boating and Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 51 CAL. L. REV. 661,
669-70 (1963). See generally William R. Casto, The Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction in
an Age of Privateers, Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117 (1993). Professor
Casto’s account relies heavily on Attorney General Edmund Randolph’s report to Congress on
the newly created federal judicial system. See H.R. REP. NO. 1-17 (1790), reprinted in 1 AM.
STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS 21 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., 1834).
47. Stolz, supra note 46, at 669.
48. See also Jonathan M. Gutoff, Admiralty, Article III, and Supreme Court Review of StateCourt Decisionmaking, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2169, 2178 n.25 (1996).
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identical to the concern for out-of-state American litigants that gave rise to the
diversity jurisdiction.49 In other words, the Framers’ awareness of private law
admiralty claims may justify a federal forum, but not a uniform federal law
governing such claims.
2.

The Nature of the Law of the Sea

The second—and more important—point is that the nature of maritime law
in the Founding era provides a compelling originalist argument against
Jensen.50 While the Framers assumed that the admiralty courts would apply
the Law of the Sea in maritime cases, that law was a branch of the law of
nations – much like the law merchant applied in commercial cases under Swift
v. Tyson.51
There is abundant research to show that the law merchant was not viewed
as federal in nature – rather, it was a system jointly administered by state and
federal courts.52 Although all courts strove for uniformity, state courts were
not bound to follow federal decisions construing the law merchant, and vice
versa.53
Although the evidence is limited regarding the maritime law, it is clear that
the Law of the Sea was also derived from the law of nations.54 Indeed, in
many cases — such as marine insurance — the maritime law dealt with the
same sorts of issues. For that reason, adherence to the original understanding
would mean treating the general maritime law as neither state nor federal, even
though that law was primarily administered by the federal courts. As Chief
Justice Marshall put it: “A case in admiralty does not, in fact, arise under the
49. See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 546 n.6
(1995) (reading Hamilton’s argument for federal admiralty jurisdiction in THE FEDERALIST NO.
80 as indicating “a concern with local bias similar to the presupposition for diversity
jurisdiction”). Uniformity concerns exist, of course, in private international trade cases. But as I
later argue, these concerns are no different from those that exist, say, in multinational non-marine
insurance transactions, or in other multinational transactions arising from an increasingly global
economy. Moreover, it is important to realize that the federal diversity courts’ role in land-based
commercial cases also had a uniformity component in the Nineteenth Century. See, e.g., Swift v.
Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). That role ended with Erie in diversity cases, and the history
provides no justification for why admiralty should be treated differently. See infra Part IV.B.
50. It is important to underscore the fact that this argument is wholly independent of the
Casto-Gutoff debate about the sorts of cases upon which the Framers’ focused in drafting the
Admiralty Clause.
51. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
52. See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513 (1984).
53. See, e.g., Delmas v. Insurance Co., 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 661, 665-66 (1871) (holding that a
commercial issue on appeal from a state supreme court did not raise a federal question); Waln v.
Thompson, 9 Serg. & Rawle 115, 121-22 (Pa. 1822) (holding that the U.S. Supreme Court’s
interpretation of general commercial law was only persuasive authority).
54. See, e.g., Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 34, at 1280-81.
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Constitution or laws of the United States. These cases are as old as navigation
itself; and the law admiralty and maritime, as it has existed for ages, is applied
by our courts to the cases as they arise.”55
The best evidence for this view is the fact that the general maritime law
survived the founding era at all. This was a time of great hostility to the very
idea of federal common law, illustrated by Madison’s Report on the Virginia
and Kentucky Resolutions and culminating in the Court’s rejection of a federal
common law of crimes in United States v. Hudson and Goodwin.56 Madison’s
discussion makes clear that one reason for this hostility was fear that extensive
federal common law would broadly preempt state regulatory authority:
[T]he consequence of admitting the common law as the law of the United
States, on the authority of the individual States, is as obvious as it would be
fatal. As this law relates to every subject of legislation, and would be
paramount to the Constitutions and laws of the States, the admission of it
would overwhelm the residuary sovereignty of the States, and by one
constructive operation new model the whole political fabric of the country.57

This hostility was never directed at Swift’s law merchant, precisely because
that law was not perceived as “federal” or preemptive. I submit that the reason
that maritime law survived is the same: it was not perceived as “federal” either.
What happened with Jensen, I think, is that changing jurisprudential
attitudes created a need to shoehorn admiralty law into either a “state” or
“federal” box. For Holmes, it belonged in the state box; meanwhile, the
Jensen majority, the “federal” box. Either way, this was a new development in
1917, and admiralty law history cannot be used to justify it.
B.

Common Law History

Whatever the original intent of the Admiralty Clause, a more evolutionary
or “common law” perspective on history58 might still try to justify Jensen’s
strong rule of maritime preemption with a different argument. The claim
would be that it is simply too late in the day to uproot the decades of practice
and precedent that have grown up in this area since 1917.59 I’m a good enough

55. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 545 (1828).
56. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). For discussion of the hostility to federal common law
during this period, see generally Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 137-42 (1996) (Souter,
J., dissenting); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003
(1985); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231
(1985).
57. Report on the Resolutions, House of Delegates, Session of 1799-1800, in 6 WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 381 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
58. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CH. L.
REV. 877 (1996); Young Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 45.
59. Professor Friedell raises a related point by suggesting that Congress somehow ratified
Jensen’s extension of federal judicial authority in passing the Admiralty Extension Act (“AEA”),
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Burkean not to quarrel with this argument in principle: If it ain’t broke, we
should think twice before we try to fix it.
The problem is that maritime preemption is broke. The Supreme Court has
decided fifty-three cases on this issue since Jensen. Yet each of the most
recent cases includes an apology from the Court for the conflicting law it has
created in this area.60 If you go through the post-Jensen case law, you can
count at least five different analytical frameworks to explain when state law
might apply in admiralty. The Court has, at various times, distinguished
between maritime “rights” and “remedies;”61 identified “gaps” in the maritime
law that may be filled by state law;62 cordoned off subjects that are “maritime
and local,”63 resorted to “balancing” and “accommodation;”64 and drew a line
between substance and procedure.65 But, none of these frameworks explains
more than a small fraction of the cases, and even advocates of a strong federal
judicial lawmaking role in admiralty concede that the Court has yet to settle on

46 U.S.C. § 740. Friedell, supra note 14, 1389-90. It is an open question whether Congress
could delegate carte blanche lawmaking power to federal courts; such a delegation would evade
the Article I limitations that normally cabin federal lawmaking. See Clark, supra note 21, at 1461
(noting the difficulty of negotiating the Article I process functions as a substantial constraint on
federal regulatory power). At the very least, the Court has required a clear statement of
Congress’ intent to delegate so broadly, and the Admiralty Extension Act says nothing at all
about substantive lawmaking authority. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum
Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opinion). Nor does the Act purport to convey any powers to
federal courts in cases arising within the pre-Extension Act jurisdiction.
It is plausible, moreover, that the Admiralty Extension Act was intended primarily to
provide that the same law govern actions arising on navigable waters and at the waterside, not
that this law necessarily be federal. See, e.g., Galligan, supra note 14, at 512 (“It is clear from its
legislative history that the primary purpose of the Act was to eliminate the inconsistent and unfair
results that could arise from adjudicating the cross claims in allision cases according to different
and conflicting legal principles.”). Professor Galligan seemingly assumes that inconsistencies
would be eliminated by applying federal maritime law across the board, rather than state law, but
neither the text of the statute nor the legislative history he quotes says this. In fact, the statute is
carefully worded to say simply that Extension Act suits will be brought “according to the
principles of law and the rules of practice obtaining” in maritime cases generally, without
entering into the Jensen debate about whether those principles should be federal in all cases. 46
U.S.C. app. § 740 (1994). While the drafters of the AEA may have had some expectation that the
extension of maritime jurisdiction would have certain substantive consequences, that unexpressed
intention is hardly sufficient to foreclose general reconsideration of federal common lawmaking
authority in admiralty. See Galligan, supra note 14, at 514-15.
60. See, e.g., Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 210 n.8 (1996); American
Dredging, 510 U.S. at 452.
61. Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., Inc., 247 U.S. 372, 384 (1918).
62. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 241 (1921).
63. Id. at 242.
64. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 739-40 (1961).
65. American Dredging, 510 U.S. at 452-53.
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a workable approach.66 Most memorably, Professor David Currie’s influential
treatment of this subject is entitled The Devil’s Own Mess.67
So the accumulation of precedent is hardly a compelling reason to abrogate
the general Erie and preemption rules—if anything, the record of Jensen’s
progeny cuts in the opposite direction.
IV. UNIFORMITY AND MARITIME COMMERCE
The other argument that admiralty experts generally raise in defense of
Jensen is the policy argument for federal uniformity in maritime law: Maritime
commerce will suffer, they say, if it is subject to fifty different state legal
regimes. I think this argument proves little even if true, and it rather
dramatically exaggerates the risks involved in bringing vertical choice of law
rules in admiralty in line with those governing the other heads of federal
jurisdiction.
A.

The Significance of Disuniformity

The short answer is that Jensen is unconstitutional, and no policy
arguments will change that. Our system of government leaves us little choice,
as Gary Lawson has said, but to “hold fast to the Constitution though the
heavens may fall.”68 While pragmatic concerns enter into constitutional law in
a number of contexts, the fact that a particular legal regime is more efficient or
represents better policy will rarely save an otherwise unconstitutional law.69
The Constitution frequently chooses other values—such as democracy,
decentralization, and checks and balances—over efficiency, and nowhere is
this more accurate than in the fields of federalism and separation of powers.
There are, moreover, good reasons to doubt whether the heavens will really
fall if Erie is applied in admiralty. Uniformity is not any more important in
maritime commerce than it is in interstate or international financial
transactions, interstate trucking, or air commerce. Yet, we do not have a
special, uniform body of law that governs these areas to the exclusion of state

66. See Robertson, supra note 17, at 91-97 (surveying the case law); Michael F. Sturley,
Federal-State Relations: Was Preble Stolz Right?, 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 317, 323 (1998)
(observing that “[t]his mess is causing real confusion for the lower courts and the bar”).
67. David P. Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: “The Devil’s Own Mess,” 1960 SUP.
CT. REV. 158.
68. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231,
1249 (1994).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free
School Zones Act over a dissent emphasizing the critical importance of gun-free schools); INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (invalidating the legislative veto over a dissent extolling the
pragmatic virtues of the procedures).
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law.70 Would each of these areas benefit (pragmatically speaking) from a set
of uniform federal rules? Perhaps. But that is not the question. The relative
health of many industries involving multi-jurisdictional activity that remain
subject to diverse state legal regimes suggests that adding maritime commerce
to this category would not prompt the sort of catastrophe that might tempt us to
bend the rules of federalism and separation of powers.71
Finally, it is critical to recognize that the various exceptions and
qualifications that have arisen to permit some use of state law under Jensen
have scotched any hope of predictability in this area, so that we aren’t really
getting the benefit of uniform federal rules anyway. For example, the
confusion caused by applying state law to marine insurance (sometimes) has
been an open scandal for decades.72 It seems likely that freely embracing Erie
would at least clear up the confusion as to the applicable choice of law rules.
In any event, the fact that marine undertakings continue to be insured despite
the uncertainties caused by Wilburn Boat suggests that maritime commerce is
more resilient in the face of diverse legal regimes than Jensen’s defenders
seem willing to concede. But if the defense of Jensen ultimately comes down
to Professor Friedell’s concession that “[t]he law in this area is a mess. But it
is our mess, and it serves a purpose,”73 then the strong uniformity argument for
Jensen seems fundamentally misplaced.
B.

Uniformity Without Jensen

Where uniformity is essential, there are other means of preserving it.
Maritime law is increasingly governed by federal statute74 – and one suspects
that these statutes are passed to cover the issues in which Congress thinks that

70. See, e.g., Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 222 (1997) (noting that the daily activities of
national banks are governed primarily by state law); Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Federal Express
Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1249-51 (6th Cir. 1996) (refusing, in the absence of statutory authorization,
to create a uniform federal cause of action concerning the pricing practices of airborne freight
carriers). Interestingly enough, the uniformity of the general commercial law was probably the
most powerful argument for adhering to the Swift regime in the Nineteenth century. See Railroad
Co. v. National Bank, 102 U.S. 14, 41-42 (1880) (Clifford, J., concurring); TONY FREYER,
HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT & ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 82-84 (1981).
Yet, commercial law has muddled through despite the revolution worked by Erie.
71. Cf. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 730 (1979) (rejecting
“generalized pleas for uniformity as substitutes for concrete evidence that adopting state law
would adversely affect administration of [specific] federal programs”).
72. See, e.g., Joel K. Goldstein, The Life and Times of Wilburn Boat: A Critical Guide (Part
I), 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 395, 398 (1997); Michael F. Sturley, Restating the Law of Marine
Insurance: A Workable Solution to the Wilburn Boat Problem, 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 41, 42-43
(1998).
73. Friedell, supra note 14, at 1393.
74. See, e.g., Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1990) (discussing maritime tort
law).
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uniformity is most important. Although I question the bootstrapping theory
that bases Congress’ “admiralty” power on judicial jurisdiction, it is clear that
these statutes are permitted under the Commerce Clause. Normal preemption
rules should apply to these statutes, and in fact that is the way the Court has
generally treated them.75 Although enacting federal legislation is always a
difficult process—as the Framers most surely intended—the maritime industry
seems precisely the type of focused, cohesive interest group that has
traditionally been effective at getting things done on Capitol Hill.76
As Professor Force points out, critical areas of maritime law remain
dominated by common law rather than federal statutes.77 In some of these
areas, state law may be an adequate substitute—particularly in those areas
where the various state laws are already relatively uniform due to adoption of
Restatements or uniform laws.78 It seems likely that abandonment of Jensen
might encourage similar further efforts in the maritime area; my colleague
Michael Sturley, for example, has urged adoption of a Restatement of Marine
Insurance Law as a solution to the problems arising from Wilburn Boat.79
In areas where the dominance of federal maritime law has left state law
undeveloped, it is important to remember that a decision overruling Jensen
would not require that prior admiralty opinions be expunged from the federal
reports. Those decisions would remain available to state courts and to federal
courts sitting in admiralty as potentially persuasive statements of maritime law,
much as federal commercial decisions were available as persuasive authority to
state courts deciding commercial issues under Swift v. Tyson in the Nineteenth
Century.80 Here, again, the project of compiling a Restatement of maritime
principles in particular areas would aid the development of state law governing
these issues and help to ensure some degree of uniformity.81

75. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978); Kelly v. Washington
ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1, 10 (1937). It is, of course, highly ironic that the presumption against
preemption already applies in the areas where Congress feels uniformity is most important, but
preemption is favored in areas that Congress has chosen to leave alone.
76. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macy, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 230 (1986) (suggesting that
small, cohesive interests are most effective at getting favorable legislation passed).
77. See, e.g., Force, supra note 44, at 1371-72 (discussing charter parties).
78. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY §§ 3-1
to 3-5, at 93-100 (2d ed. 1975) (noting the use of the Uniform Commercial Code in governing
bills of lading).
79. See Sturley, supra note 66, at 42.
80. See Fletcher, supra note 52, at 1549. As Judge Fletcher’s research demonstrates, the
Swift model—under which both state and federal courts strove for uniformity despite not being
directly bound by the others’ decisions—was relatively successful so long as it was confined to a
relatively narrow subject area. See id. at 1554.
81. I have reservations about Professor Sturley’s project as it applies to marine insurance in
particular. Because of Wilburn Boat, Professor Sturley suggests, the federal admiralty courts
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Nor would adoption of Erie require federal courts wholly to abandon their
own substantive lawmaking jurisdiction. Those courts would continue to make
maritime law in cases that fall outside the legislative competence of the States
– where the events at issue happen outside the three-mile limit, for example.
As long as this body of law exists, it is available to govern cases of particularly
strong federal interest under normal conflicts of law principles. In essence, I
would treat the maritime law as the law of a coequal state, rather than as
preemptive “federal” law.82 This is largely consistent with the status of
“general” law prior to Erie and Jensen. And it should ensure that in cases
where there is some federal interest unique to admiralty –- and not just an
undifferentiated interest in uniformity -– federal courts would retain their
power to protect that interest by making rules of common law.83
The problem remains of deliberate state departures from uniformity. But
here the dormant Commerce Clause is available to police state efforts to
Maritime commerce is no less
interfere with maritime commerce.84
85
And state attempts to discriminate
“commerce” because it is maritime.
against such commerce or impose excessive burdens on it would be
unconstitutional under established Commerce Clause doctrine with or without
Jensen.86

have not developed a uniform law of marine insurance. See Sturley, supra note 66, at 54-55. If
that is the case, then what would a Restatement re-state? To the extent that admiralty courts have
been applying general principles of state insurance law to marine cases, this will limit the
American Law Institute’s ability to formulate a set of rules optimized for the marine insurance
industry. The persuasive authority of the Restatements, after all, has always depended largely on
the assumption that these documents represent a distillation of the decisional law as it already
exists. Restatement authors, of course, frequently must choose the “best” among conflicting
rules, and the kind of knowledgeable consideration that the ALI could bring to this task would
likely be of great benefit to courts. Those courts must recognize, however, that their authority to
adopt a Restatement view that differs from state law in the marine insurance field is no greater
than, say, in the field of torts or contracts. A Restatement approach thus seems quite limited in its
ability to serve as an alternative to the messy and onerous route of legislation. See id. at 53 &
n.105.
82. For a fuller discussion, see Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273,
353-58.
83. Such interests might dictate, for example, that federal law governs cases implicating
foreign relations; however, these cases might be better described as subject to the doctrine of
foreign affairs preemption. See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968).
84. Likewise, as already noted, some such laws would be preempted by federal control over
foreign affairs. See id. at 440-41. Given the pervasive international implications of state
regulation in a global economy, of course, the foreign affairs preemption doctrine is badly in need
of a limiting principle. That problem is beyond the scope of this discussion.
85. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193 (1824) (holding that “commerce”
includes navigation).
86. See, e.g., Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331 (1996); Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 141-42 (1970).
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CONCLUSION
In concluding, I want to emphasize that much of what I have said is not
new. No one has demonstrated the present doctrinal disarray in this area more
persuasively than David Robertson.87 And Preble Stolz argued over thirty-five
years ago that, at least in some areas, admiralty was ousting state regulatory
authority in areas of important state interests.88 But while the pages of the
Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce have been filled with various proposals
for charting a course between federal and state dominance — Professor
Robertson alone has two different entries89 — I’m proposing that it’s time to
abandon ship. There is simply no constitutional mandate for treating the basic
common law powers of the federal courts differently here than in other areas,
or for applying different rules of preemption in admiralty. Nor will the sky
fall, as a practical matter, if Erie is applied in maritime cases.
I think this is where the Court is headed after American Dredging and
Yamaha. American Dredging offered only the most tepid of endorsements in
refusing to overrule Jensen, while Yamaha ignored Jensen entirely.90 And
even my colleagues on this panel, who have adopted a more traditional view of
the supremacy of federal maritime law, seem unwilling to defend Jensen
itself.91 But even if Jensen is teetering on the brink of extinction, it could still
use a good strong push. And any regime that replaces Jensen will succeed
only if it is consistent with the general principles of federalism and separation
of powers that order vertical choice of law problems generally.

87. See generally Robertson, supra note 17; David W. Robertson, Displacement of State
Law by Federal Maritime Law, 26 J. MAR. L. & COM. 325 (1995).
88. See Stolz, supra note 46, at 661-65.
89. See Robertson, Displacement of State Law by Federal Maritime Law, supra note 86, at
357; David W. Robertson, Summertime Sailing and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Need for a
National Admiralty Court, 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 275, 292-95 (1998).
90. American Dredging, 510 U.S. at 447 n.1 (1994); Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 215 n.13 (1996)
(noting state authority over maritime cases without mentioning Jensen).
91. See Force, supra note 44, at 1384-87; Friedell, supra note 14, at 1390, 1393.

